Absfracf-WFreIess Internet maming may include several tilayer security scheme can provide a comprehensive soluradio access networks involvingdifferent layer 2 technologies tion that can possibly reduce any such attack and can support such as 802.11b, CDMA and GPRS. As a mobile user moves a dependable and secured multimedia application. Buildamund and witches between wireless cells, subnets and do-ing a wireless Internet telephony and streaming multimedia mains, it needs to maintain thesession continui&. At thesame testbed is based on a basic framework discussed in [7] . A lime security of signaling and fransport media should not comprehensive testbed has been designed and implemented be compromised. A multi-layer security framework involv-where the proof-of-concept for different functional compoing user authenfication, packet based encryption and access nents of a next generation wireless network including secucontml mechanism can pmvide the desired level ofsecurity rity can be demonstrated. Some of the important features of fo the mobile users. Architecture, implementation and per-the multimedia testbed include mechanism to provide supformance of a similar framework in a mobile envimnment port for roaming across different carrier domains (e.g., miis presented here. Results and peflormance analysis of the cro, macro,and domain mobility) with a provision for billing implementation will be of immense value for wireless Inter-and network management, quality of service, security, aunet servicepmviders, before it is actually deployed in a wide thentication and support for IPv6. Here we focuss on a scale manner:
1 Introduction security in a mobile wireless Internet. Section 3 elaborates several functional components of the multimedia testbed. Multimedia streaming traffic is gaining momentum as one of Section 4 describes the architectural framework and operthe killer application for the next generation Internet. Stream ational procedure of the multi-layer security features proing media includes interactive traffic such as IP telephony and posed. Implementation overview and performance details are broadcast or multicast content delivew. Supporting stream-presented in section 5 . Finally we conclude the paper in secing traffic in a mobile wireless Internet is faced with several tion 6. challenges due to continuous handoff experienced by a mobile user. These challenges include dynamic binding, location management, quality of sevice and end-to-end security 2 for signaling and transport. Mobile users will use heterogeneous radio access networking technologies such as 802.1 Ib, Recently there have been flurry of activities in the area of se-CDMA, and GPRS specific to LAN (Local Area Network) curity for mobile networking in wireless environment. Most and WAN (Wide Area Network) respectively. Mobility sup-of the previous work focus on encryption mechanism and key port in this environment can be provided by variety of mo-distribution methodology. Reference [E], [9] explain differbility management techniques such as Mobile E ' [ I] and its ent ways of how Mobile IP and IPSec [IO] can work together. variants such as IDMP [Z], MIP-LR [3] and micro-mobility [I I] explains some of the insecurity associated with 802.1 1. management techniques such as HAWAII [4] , Cellular IP [SI, Reference [ 121 provides an IPSec based solution in mobile application layer mobility management techniques such as IP environment by instituting an IPSec gateway next to home SIP-MM [6] . It is imperative that both signaling and trans-agent. However these proposals do not provide a comprehenport media sessions are secured, the user is authenticated as it sive solution for end-to-end security across provider domains moves around between cells, subnets and domains. Thus it is involving AAA (Accounting, Authorization and Authenticadesirable to develop a multi-layer security framework for the tion) entities. Most recently Mobile IP working group is lookmobile users that is independent of layer 2 access technolo-ing into supporting P S e c based VF" (Vimal Private Netgies.
work) for mobile networks by instituting dual home agents. As the mobile moves, it is subjected to potential attack But overhead and encapsulation associated with this triple enat different parts of the access and core network. A mul-capsulation may not be suitable for real-time communication. 
Related Work

Mobile Multimedia Components
Current multimedia testbed is shown in Figure 1 . This testbed emulates a wireless Internet with multiple carrier domains. Mobile stations are multi-media laptops and PDAs equipped with cameras, and audio devices and have either built-in feature or PCMCIA slots for 802.1 Ib and CDMAIXRTT interface for communication.
Base stations provide the last-hop connectivity to the mobile users over different types of radio access network such as 802.1 Ih, Bluetooth and CDMNCPRS. An ERC (Edge Routing and Controller) in the testbed is a routing and control system that connects a wireless access network to a regional wireline IP network. Each ERC may suppon several RANs. An ERC comprises two functional entities, an edge router (ER) and an Edge Control Agent (ECA). The ER functions as an IP router, while rhe ECA is an intelligent agent that interacts with the Domain Control Anent (DCA) to control agent runs on all the communicating nodes that helps set up and tear down the multi-media calls. A SIP server can act in proxyire-direct mode and can also behave as a registrar. When a call is established using a SIP server (nondirect mode), it can interact with location server such as finger server or rwho server, and can provide services such as registration, secured key exchange and location updates. cryption and end-to-end security for both signaling and media. Two types of mobility approaches have been illustrated in this paper; network layer mobility binding using SUN'S mobile IP and application layer mobility using SIP mobility.
SUN mobile IP was used in conjunction with DRCP so that the client obtains a new care-of IP address and does not need any foreign agent in the visited domain. Unlike Mobile IP, SIP based mobility provides an end-to-end mobility solution without depending upon underlying home agent or foreign agent. A specific carrier domain is designated to be an AAA domain. The mobile multimedia testbed is using Diameter [ I61 as an AAA (Authentication, Authorization and Accounting) protocol running on NAS (Network Access Servers) and AAA servers to provideprofile based mification services. In addition, anew protocol is being developed calledPANA [I71 that provides user-to-network access control. PANA provides access control mechanism to the mobile client and can work as front end to an AAA server running Diameter. It acts as a user front-end for Diameter server. PANA is implemented as a user level protocol to enable a flexible access control that works independent of any layer 2 technology, on both IPv4
The domain control agent (DCA) provides session man:. and IPv6. It can work with any configuration protocol such agement as well as the means of interaction between users as DHCP and DRCP. An access control mechanism involving and among network contml entities. DCA also supports 1) SIP, PANA and AAA has been developed that will protect the mobility management, 2) authentication, authorization and intruders from hijacking an established session. AAA funcaccounting and 3) QoS management. It is assumed that each tionality has been added by instituting Diameter servers in autonomous system has several components of domain con-each domain (visited and foreign) that help provide profile trol agent distributed within its entity.
verification for the mobile users. The AAA framework acts Location management and application layer mobility @er-as a backend entity to PANA server or SIP server and helps sonal and terminal) are taken care of by SIP [13] . SIP user in semng up the access control at the edge router.
1
Following lists several of the access control mechanism us-Network Access) registration with the PANA server in the doing SIP, AAA, PANA and IPSEC functionality. SIP and AAA main. Since the PANA server has no pre-established security based security model provides access control on SIP regis-association with the MH at the time of PANA registration, the tration and SIP signaling. PANA and AAA based security PANA server consults with the home AAA server directly or model helps access control on the edge routers and interacts indirectly through a local AAA server by using Diameter prowith IPSec to provide packet encryption.
tocol to authenticate the user on the MH. Once the PANA registration is successful, an LSA (Local Security Association) is
SIP-AAA Model
We have implemented the following SIP-AAA interaction model in order to realize how SIP signaling can interact with AAA infrastructure in a mobile environment. In this model when the SIP server receives a SIP Register message from the MH, it consults with the home AAA server for authentication and authorization by using Diameter protocol. SIP user's profile verification database is located in the home AAA server, not in the SIP server. It is to he noted that although our SIP-AAA interaction implementation covers only the limited cases in which local SIP server or SIP proxy is not involved, several methods have been proposed such as [18] and [I91 in order to cover the entire scenario of SIP-AAA interaction.
established between the MH and PANA server so that any further authentication that is required for intra-domain hand-off is performed locally and quickly at the PANA server without contacting the home AAA server. In addition to intra-domain hand-off case during movement, the local authentication is also performed periodically in order to detect the event that the user silently disappears from the domain due to, e.g., hattery exhaustion or bad radio conditions. The PANA server that resides in ERC maintains an association between the user identity such as an NAI (Network Access Identifier) and lower-layer identity such as an IP address for each user. The ERC also has a firewall functionality so that only the packets sent fromito the MH belonging to the authorized users can pass through the firewall. Since the
PANA offers registration/authentication at the appli-association between the user identity and lower-layer identity cation level with AAA p i m e t e r ) framework. Initial autho. dynamically changes as a result of hand-off, the ERC updates riation is taken a r e of by PANA protocol that helps setting the access control list of the firewall if and only if there is a up the fircwalls within ERC and thus controls any signal or change in the association and the resulting PANA registration data traffic that is passed onto the network. This offers local Or a local authentication is successful. This means that SIP authentication for quick handoff as the client moves between Register Or Re-invite messages will not pass through the lirethe suhnets within a domain. In this model SIP registration Wall until the access conlrol list is updated in the edge router. is authenticated only after consulting with A M server. tn
It is possible to combine PANA with various kinds of acusual case, SIP registration is done in the SIP server, after CeSS Control mechanism. In the testbed, PANA is used to prothe client obtains a new address. Interaction between the SIP vide dynamic control of a router with firewall functionalities Server AAA Server is meant to provide a mechanism so so that full network access is authorized for only hosts assothat a communicating user's activities are monitored securely ciated with authenticated PANA clients. The firewall which for accounting and auditing purposes. Besides authentication was once opened for an authorized hosts is closed immedivia home SIP server and home AAA server, a user is also ately when periodical PANA re-authentication fails. An exauthenticated via interaction between local AAA Server and ample message sequence for PANA Diameter is illustrated in home AAA server using Diameter. Figure 2 shows SIP-AAA interaction that has been implemented in the testbed.
3.
Packet encryption
Although 802.1 Ih access provides WEP (Wired Equivalent Privacy) based encryption scheme for the last-mile wireless hop, we have used an IPSEC based encryption mechanism to secure the packets on the last hop wireless networks so that it can be layer 2 agnostic. An IPSEC tunnel is established between the mobile client and the edge router by distributing the key using lKE (Internet Key Exchange) mechanism. We use PANA for distributing IKE credentials to an authorized host. When the host is authorized as a result of PANA based authentication, the IKE credentials are camed in a PANA message and are transferred h m the PANA authentication agent to the host. The credentials are then used for establishing an IPsec tunnel between a host and an access router, that provides a secure unicast communication channel in the access network including a wireless LAN segment.
The dynamic distribution of the ME credentials enables hosts
IPSec-PANA-AAA model
to roam among different administrative domains since there is The proposed multi-layered security scheme provides packet no need for a host topre-configure the credentials. As the mobased encryption and an application layer authentication bile moves to a different subnet and attaches to a new subnet, based on user NAI. When the MH moves into a new domain, another IPSec tunnel is established between the mobile host it performs a PANA (Protocol for carrying Authentication for and the edge router. It is to he noted that this IPSec tunnel 
End-to-end security
While an IPSEC based encryption mechanism helps secure the last hop wireless channel, it is essential to provide endto-end security to both the data and signaling. A combination of Mobile IP and IP-Sec based solution can provide one such architecture hut it suffers from the overhead associatd with triple-encapsulation. Since the Real-time traffic is RTP/UDP based, secured RTP (SRTP) [20] is used to provide encryption to different types of multimedia traffic such as audio, video and data. Setting up a secured RTP session involves exchanging separate RTP key between the mobile host and correspondent host for a specific real-time media type as audio, video or data. SIP clients use PGP based authentication scheme while registering with the SIP servers. RTP key exchange takes place by means of INVITE-exchange method using SIP signaling at the time of setting up calls. Since RTP key is part of SDP parameters it is protected using S i M l M E (Secured MIME) [21] mechanism. This methodology ensures that both signaling and data can be secured end-to-end and does not suffer from extra overhead associated. Figure  4 shows a snapshot of the components involving DRCP, SIP, IPSec, PANA, Diameter and Mobile IP.
Sequence of operation
In order to demonstrate seamless mobility, different suite of protocols have to intenvork at several layers to provide desired functionality. Figure 5 shows a protocol flow where Mobile IP based mobility binding is used and figure 6 shows a protocol flow for SIP based mobility with Secured RTP for end-to-end security. Mobile station in the home network tries to make a SIP call before the user is authorized by the PANA server, and it fails. This demonstrates that the client needs to be authenticated at the nearest ERC before the SIP signaling goes through. Then the MS activates PANA agent for user registration to open the firewall rules controlled by ERC by providing the correct NAI (Network Access Identifier). Then CH makes a SIP call to MS using SIP proxy server which is in the same domain. During this time the SRTP key is exchanged as part of INVITE exchange mechanism. MS starts to move towards another domain and experiences a domain handofffirst (Domains are segregated as AAA domains not DNS domains in this case) and then a micro and a macro handoff respectively once it is present in the new domain. As soon as it moves to a new domain (which is also a new subnet), it listens to the DRCP server advertisement and gets a new IP address to get it quicklyconfigured. Session continuity is taken care of by SIP Re-INVITE or Mobile I P binding update, while user authentication is taken care of by PANA within a domain. Interaction between the AAA servers is performed only when MH moves between domains. In case of SIP based terminal mobility, continuity is achieved by re-inviting the Correspondent Host (CH) everytime MH moves to a new subnet, and thus getting the media re-directed to the correct IP address.
Time taken for media delivery (redirection) is not affected by SIP'S re-registration mechanism, but the local authentication mechanism by PANA will probably delay the media delivery to some extent because of the established firewall. Reregistration is mostly done for any new incoming multimedia calls as the mobile host moves away. While PANA provides a user based authentication, IP-Sec from [IO] has been implemented between the client and the first hop router to provide packet based security. In the testbed IPSec tunnels are set up between the client and ERCI. These get de-tunneled beyond ERCl and tunneling takes places again between ERCZ and MH after the handover. However in case of Mobile IP binding, mobile node can interface with IPsec and firewall triggered by PANA agent. In order to work with firewall mobile node has to create reverse 1P tunneling from mobile's care-of-address back to home agent. 
Performance Analysis
Experiments were carried out in the multimedia testbed to validate the features of secured inter-domain mobility. Measurements were taken for both Mobile IP and SIP based terminal mobility as they interacted with DRCP, PANA and IPSec. We took measurements to figure out the timing associated with each atomic operation during the process. This measurement process allowed us to determine the timing for each of the operation associated with signaling, time for moving between cells, triggering to obtain an IP address using DRCP, sending the PANA messages for PANA-AAA inteiction, interaction between the Diameter sewer and SIP server, interaction between two AAA servers during the domain handoff, Mobile IP registration with IP-Sec tunnels.
It is noteworthy to mention that, these parameters strongly ERCl and ERC2 adds an overhead ofabout 53 bytes f o r u m depend on media used, number of hops, authentication mecb-packets that comprise the IP headers, SPI, Sequence number anism used, background traffic, processing speed ofthe cor-and authentication header. Sun's Mobile IP code has been respondent and mobile hosts. A complete Re-invite, OK and modified so that it can work with DRCP while enabling re-ACK sequence associated with SIP took about 500 ms includ-verse p m e l i n g over IPSec.
In the secured mobility aing the processing time at the end hosts. AS m optimization periment it was found that overall timing for RTP packet intechnique CH could start fonvarding the data to the MH as temption due to DRCP, PANA and SIP amounts to be under soon as it receives the Re-Invite message (without waiting 2 sec. SIP Re-MVITE retransmission takes place during the for ACK and OK message) thus helping to reduce the time domain handoff, if the PANA registration has not completed for media redirection by about 350 ms. Address during the domain handoff. But this can also be reduced if because ofDRCp is 100 msec, but that does not in-the PANA registration takes place before SIP re-invite is isclude the extra time needed to detect the channel change at sued. As it turns out, the hulk of the time is consumed for SIP layer 2 or DRCP server advertisement periodically. SIP re-signaling @-Invite, ACY OK) which is about 600 ms. As registration does not gffect the media re-direction to the new evident, domain hand-off takes more time than subnet handaddress, since it is independent of the Re-Invite process and off because of extra time taken due to interaction with the is used mostly. for location management. A typical complete AAA server. In optimized mode, the total intemption due registration process so that the client's new IP address gets to subnet and domain handoff is limited to 400 msec, with updated in the SIP server is about 150 ms. From the experi-domain handoff taking s k h t b more time because of AAA mental results it was observed that it takes almost I sec from interaction. the time it lost connectivity with the old access point until the Table 1 shows the timing associated with different funchost gets configured with the new channel number under the tional components for subnet and domain handoff measured new access point. As it binds to the new access point and in seconds. As is evident domain handoff takes more time listens to the server advertisement, DRCP Discover process than subnet handoff because of associated AAA interaction. sets in by the client. Beacon interval from an 802.1 Ib access Figure 7 shows the loss of RTP packets as the mobile is suhpoint is about 100 msec (this value is however variable) that jected to inter-domain handoff using application layer SIP contributes to the L2 delay. It is assumed that rest of the time based mobility approach. Figure 8 shows similar results when is used to process the beacon and set up the channel number the mobile is subjected to inter-domain handoff hut uses netin the application before a layer 2 association is established. work layer mobile IP based approach. It is interesting to Secured mobile communication has been demonstrated note that SIP based mobility approach offers less gap in RTP by integrating both Mobile IP and SIP based mobility with packets during the mobile's handoff between subnets belongIPSec, PANA and AAA. IP-Sec tunnel between the client and ing to two different domains compared to Mobile IP based This paper provides an architectural and implementation perspective of secured mobile multimedia communication supporting wireless Internet telephony and streaming multimedia. It has realized several functional components needed to provide a seamless operation over the wireless Internet across multiple service provider domains. In addition to describing the functional components of the architecture, and sequence of operation, it has highlighted some ofthe performance measurement to determine the time taken for supporting secured inter-domain mobility. Two primary mobility binding approaches were investigated to realize these atomic operations.
Results and analysis of the secured multimedia conununication in an emulated Internet will prove beneficial for the mo-. .
bile wireless operators.
